







The S&P 500 Index Effect in Continuous Time: 
Evidence from Overnight, Intraday and Tick-by-Tick      
Stock Price Performance 
 
 
Konstantina Kappou  
Credit Suisse 
 
Chris Brooks  
ICMA Centre, University of Reading 
 
Charles Ward 





ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2007-05 
 
Copyright 2007 Kappou, Brooks and Ward. All rights reserved. 
 
ICMA Centre • The University of Reading  
Whiteknights • PO Box 242 • Reading RG6 6BA  • UK 
Tel: +44 (0)1183 788239  • Fax: +44 (0)1189 314741 
Web: www.icmacentre.rdg.ac.uk 
Director: Professor John Board, Chair in Finance 
The ICMA Centre is supported by the International Capital Market Association 
   
   1 
Abstract 
The advent of index tracking early in the 1970s and the continuous growth of assets tied to the S&P 
500 index have enforced  perceptions  of the  importance  of  becoming an  index-member,  due  to 
increased demand by index fund participants for the stocks involved in index composition changes. 
This study focuses on S&P 500 inclusions and examines the impact of potential overnight price 
adjustment after the announcement of an S&P 500 index change.  We find evidence of a significant 
overnight price change that diminishes the profits available to speculators although there are still 
profits available from the first day after announcement until a few days after the actual event. More 
importantly observing the tick-by-tick stock price performance of the key days of the event window 
for the first time, we find evidence of consistent trading patterns during trading hours over inclusion 
event. A separate analysis of two different sub-periods as well as of NASDAQ and NYSE listed 
stocks allows for a detailed examination of the price and volume effect in continuous time. 
JEL Classification Numbers: G10, G14 
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I. Introduction 
Over the last 20 years, index funds have become extremely popular, with total worldwide explicitly indexed 
assets estimated to exceed $1 trillion. Jensen (1968) showed almost four decades ago that active portfolio 
managers found it hard to beat the index most of the time, and numerous subsequent studies have confirmed 
that active management is hard pushed to deliver better performance than the index return less transaction 
costs. When “trackers” follow a benchmark index, their investment decisions are not based on fundamental 
analysis.  In  contrast,  they  make  the  necessary  portfolio  adjustments  only  to  reduce  tracking  error.  This 
behavior ensures that index member stocks will be preferred to non-index members for such funds. Thus, the 
deletion of an existing member-firm from a widely followed benchmark has a significant implication for fund 
managers. For pure index trackers, the only reason, apart from changing cash flows, for trading stocks will be 
index composition reviews; the more money tied to the index, the more will be expended in reducing the 
tracking error. 
 
The “index effect” refers to the price pressure that is observed when a stock is added to or deleted from an 
index. If the index is widely tracked, then profits can be made by buying (selling) the shares of the added 
(deleted) firm ahead of index funds and selling (buying) them at a later stage, when index fund demand 
(supply) is satisfied. The more money is tied to the index, the more index portfolio managers will be involved 
in trading the underlying stocks around the index recomposition. Index trackers ensure that demand will 
increase for added stocks and will reduce for deleted stocks. For many years, “buying additions and selling 
deletions” has been a lucrative strategy for investors not involved in index tracking. 
 
This study examines the impact of potential overnight price adjustment after the announcement of an S&P 
500 index addition as well as the impact of the effect on the price and volume performance of the stocks on a 
tick-by-tick basis. A separate analysis is also conducted for two different sub-periods as well as for NASDAQ 
versus NYSE listed stocks. Previous studies have mainly concentrated on a close-to-close abnormal return 
analysis and showed that there is a significant price increase between the close on the announcement date and 
the close on the day after. However, the purchase of the added stock cannot be made at the close of trading 
on the announcement date, because the information is released in the market after the market close. The first 
trading opportunity arises in the morning of the first date after announcement, where the stock opens at a 
very high price level resulting in lower actual trading profits; our study investigates this issue in detail. 
 
The following analysis differs from previous studies in four important areas. First, the results involve not only 
close-to-close abnormal returns but also overnight and open-to-close abnormal returns. Second, the tick-by-
tick performance of the added stocks is examined for the first time for the years 1999 and 2000. Third, NYSE 
and NASDAQ samples are examined separately to determine the impact of trading venue on the index effect. ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2007-05 
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Finally, we make use of a more recent and longer run of data on index additions; index changes are examined 
for a period that comprises both bullish and bearish market trends. 
 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section two provides a full description of the major stock 
selection criteria and the announcement policies of the Standard and Poor’s Index Committee. Section three 
presents  a  brief  summary  of  previous  relevant  studies  associated  with  S&P  500  index  changes  and  the 
prevailing hypotheses that lie behind the companies’ post-event performance. Section four examines the stock 
performance after addition by using overnight and open-to close data and section five provides results using 
tick-by-tick abnormal returns. Section six presents an analysis of the index effect in continuous time and 
section seven concludes. 
 
II. Index Tracking and the S&P 500 
The S&P 500 is a value-weighted index, the level of which reflects the market value of all 500 component US 
stocks relative  to  a  particular  base  period.  Stocks  are selected to  be  representatives of  their  sector. The 
selection and management of the index is determined by the Standard and Poor’s Index Committee. Changes 
in index composition are mainly caused by member companies effectively ceasing to exist in their current 
form through mergers, takeovers, restructuring or bankruptcies. The replacement process for deleted firms is 
a  complicated  issue.  According  to  a  statement  of  Standard  and  Poor’s  “candidate  firms  are  monitored 
carefully and the criteria for inclusion are highly stringent”. After screening candidate companies, an S&P 500 
Replacement  Pool  is  created  that  contains  at  least  10  companies.  The  prevailing  company  from  the 
Replacement Pool is chosen whenever a new entry to the index is required following the deletion of another 
company. The selection process for S&P 500 membership does not simply refer to a typical quantitative 
ranking system based on market capitalisation. Therefore, it is difficult for institutional investors and fund 
managers to anticipate the changes. This is in contrast with the procedures that operate for most other major 
indices. In general, but not exclusively, S&P member companies have the largest market value in their sector 
and are chosen to represent their industry in the US market. The selection process entails an examination of 
the firm’s trading activity, such as public float1 and liquidity/turnover ratios, to ensure high liquidity and to 
reduce the probability of deviations from the fair stock price. Ownership of the company is also monitored to 
detect “closely held” companies. 
 
Standard and Poor’s changed their announcement policy twice – in September 1976 and more recently in 
October 1989. The latter change was made in order to alleviate the price pressure on the announcement date 
                                                       
1 In March 2004, Standard and Poor’s announced that it will convert all major U.S. indices to float-adjusted and in September 2004 it 
released details for the methodology of free-float calculation.  Free-float adjustment is considered to be the “next step” in keeping S&P 
indices representative of the market and the most relevant solution for investment needs. In March 2005, S&P 500 became half-float 
adjusted and in September 2005, full-float adjusted. ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2007-05 
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that occurred prior to this when index inclusion took place immediately the day after announcement. Changes 
are now pre-announced an average of five days before the event. The period from the announcement date to 
the effective date can give enough time for institutional investors and index fund managers to adjust their 
holdings, if they so wish. The announcement, which takes place after the market close, reveals the name of the 
firm that will be added (deleted) and the exact date that the event will take place2. In some cases, however, the 
exact date of the event is not announced. In those cases, the announcement states only the names of the 
firms, and the exact event will happen at a date to be announced. Thus, investors and index fund managers 
have to wait until the event announcement that will happen at the market close of a future date. The change 
will then become effective the next morning of the event announcement. 
 
III. Previous Literature 
The period during which a change in index composition occurs constitutes a useful laboratory for testing the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). Fama (1970) has defined an efficient market as a market in which 
security prices reflect all available information. The semi-strong form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
states that all publicly available information is reflected on security prices. Under this theory, the market’s 
historical knowledge of abnormal returns for index additions (deletions) will drive the security’s price up 
(down) to its expected addition (deletion)-day value on the day after the announcement (Cusick, 2002). The 
profits from buying the stock on the day after the announcement and selling it on the effective date should be 
fully eliminated and the increase in the security’s price should happen overnight.  
 
The index effect has been shown in numerous studies to result in stock price behavior during the event period 
that appears inconsistent with EMH. Consequently, a number of hypotheses have been proposed to justify 
this performance. These are the Price Pressure Hypothesis, the Imperfect Substitutes/Downward-Sloping 
Demand  Curve  for  Stocks  Hypothesis,  the  Liquidity  Cost  Hypothesis,  the  Information  Content/Index 
Member  Certification  Hypothesis,  and  the  Market  Segmentation/Investor  Recognition  Hypothesis.  Their 
main differences concern whether the stock price or volume change is temporary or permanent after the 
event, what kind of information is revealed with an addition or deletion, and what are the main issues for 
stock and investor behavior. While the number of papers examining whether these hypotheses have received 
empirical support is large, with the exception of three, all have considered only close-to-close returns. Such 
research arguably presents a misleading picture of the profitability of trading on changes in index composition 
since these profits cannot be realized by investors.  
 
                                                       
2 We would like to thank Milvia Luckenbach and Srikant Dash from Standard and Poor’s Corporation for providing information about 
the new announcement policy. ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2007-05 
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Beneish and Whaley (1996) as well as in a later paper (1997) were the first to examine close-to-open returns to 
measure the extent of the overnight performance that is consistent with market efficiency. The information of 
a newly added stock is announced at the close of trading, and under the old announcement policy, the change 
takes place immediately the day after. Therefore, overnight pressure under the old policy is expected to be 
larger, since there is no interval between announcement and event. The major part of the abnormal close-to-
close return of added stocks under the old announcement policy is caused overnight (4.37% with a t-ratio of 
11.69) and the open-to-close abnormal return of the following day is -0.62% (with a t-ratio of -2.35) leaving 
no  profitable  trading  opportunities.  Under  the  new  announcement  policy  however,  a  significant  but 
substantially smaller in magnitude abnormal return is caused overnight (2.46% with a t-ratio of 5.52) with an 
insignificant (positive) open-to-close return the next day (0.6%). 
 
Open-to-close returns are also examined by Cusick (2002), who finds evidence of an increase in market 
efficiency through time, and a decrease in the trading profit available to arbitrageurs who are buying additions 
and  selling  deletions.  By  using  the  level  of  the  overnight  abnormal  return  from  the  closing  of  the 
announcement date until the following morning as a proxy for investors’ interest, he shows that the potential 
trading profits available have decreased over time. His main conclusion is that investors’ interest will outweigh 
the increase in indexing and the available trading profit will be diminished through time. 
 
There is no previous literature for the S&P 500 index effect that concerns tick-by-tick data. The methodology 
used in this piece of work to obtain abnormal returns in continuous time is similar to that of Wood, McInish 
and Ord (1985) who examined the return characteristics of trades at the micro level, although not relating 
specifically to the index effect. The authors observed a difference in return distributions among overnight 
trades, trades during the first 30 minutes following the market opening, trades at the market close and trades 
during the remainder of the day. Moreover, by using a minute-to-minute market return series for a large 
sample of NYSE stocks during 1972 and 1982, they found high returns and standard deviations of returns at 
the beginning and at the end of the trading day, providing evidence of U-shaped intraday patterns. In the case 
of S&P 500 inclusions, new information is been released overnight and increased trading volume is expected 
at the beginning of the day after announcement. According to Easley and O’Hara (1992), bid-ask spreads 
should  widen  upon  occurrence  of  large  block  transactions  to  reflect  the  uncertainty  of  the  future  price 
equilibrium and therefore, high standard deviations of intraday returns should also be expected. However, 
inclusions are events that require significant index fund rebalancing and specialists as well as market makers 
can afford to tighten the spread due to increased volumes, and may choose to do so in the short-run (Beneish 
and Whaley, 1996). In any case, the U-shaped pattern of return variation may not be pronounced since 
significant trading activity is likely to occur throughout the whole trading day and the evidence of increased ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2007-05 
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liquidity found in previous studies (Edmister, Graham and Pirie, 1996 and Erwin and Miller, 1998) will not 
adversely affect trading costs. 
 
IV. The Overnight and Open-to-Close Effect 
a) Data and Methodology 
The stock opening and closing prices were obtained from Thomson Datastream. There were insufficient data for 
the benchmark opening prices before the year 1993 and therefore, the firms that were added to the S&P 500 
before that year had to be eliminated; the final sample contains 266 stock additions to the S&P 500 for the 
period 1993-2002. The abnormal open-to-close return (OTC) for each firm is obtained by subtracting the 
open-to-close performance of the stock from that of the benchmark on the corresponding date. The same 
approach is repeated for calculating close-to-close abnormal returns (CTC) from the announcement day (AD) 
close  until  AD+1  close.  The  overnight  performance  is  then  derived  from  subtracting  the  open-to-close 
performance from the close-to-close performance as shown in the following equations: 
 =    it it mt CTC CTC   CTC AR R - R         (1)     
 =  it it mt OTC OTC OTC AR R - R         (2)   
it it it CTC OTC OVR = AR - AR         (3) 
where, in the case of the first day after the S&P press release, RCTCit and RCTCmt are the close-to-close returns 
between AD and AD+1 for the stock and the S&P 500 respectively, ROTCit and ROTCmt are the open-to-close 
returns between AD+1 open and AD+1 close for the stock and the benchmark respectively, ARCTCit, AROTCit 
are  the  abnormal  close-to-close  and  open-to-close  returns  for  each  stock  respectively,  and  OVRit  is  the 
overnight (non-tradable) abnormal return between AD close and AD+1 open for each firm. This method is 
repeated for all trading days during the event window until the day after the effective index changes (ED+1). 
 
b) Results 
i. The whole sample 
Table 1 presents the close-to-close and open-to-close data between announcement date and effective date 
with their corresponding t-statistics. Figures in bold denote significance at the 5% level or better. On the date 
of announcement (AD), the open-to-close return is insignificant, indicating no pre-emptive trading of the 
future index change that is going to be announced after the market close. Moreover, despite the 4.06% 
abnormal return from the close of trading on AD to the close of trading AD+1, it is clear that there are no 
trading opportunities on AD+1 because the AD+1 open to AD+1 close return is significantly negative at the 
1% level (-0.83%). Thus, the first day price increase cannot be traded unless the stock is purchased before the 
AD market close.  
 ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2007-05 
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The overall overnight performance reaches 4.89% (significantly different from zero at the 1% level), indicating 
that market makers have very positive expectations concerning added firms. The level of overnight return of 
4.89% is obtained by subtracting the AD+1 open-to-close abnormal return           (-0.83%) from the AD+1 
close-to-close abnormal return (4.06%). This can be done for all days in the event window by using the data of 
Table 1, but only the overnight returns on the announcement and event dates are reported since the market 
receives new information on these dates only.  
 
Table 2 repeats the above analysis but the sample is now divided into two different sub-periods, for the years 
1993-1997 and 1998-2002. Additions to and deletions from the S&P 500 have become more frequent over the 
last five years and therefore, the sample of firms added to the index during the period 1998-2002 is larger (88 
firms in the earlier sub-period and 178 firms in the later one) . The added firms of the first sub-period (1993-
1997) experience an overnight price increase of 3.89% after the close of AD and a further marginal and 
insignificant price increase of 0.02% between AD+1 opening and AD+1 close. By contrast, in the more 
recent sub-period, the overnight performance between AD close and AD+1 open reaches the level of 5.38% 
with a highly significant negative return of -1.25% from the opening until the close on the day after (AD+1). 
This negative open-to-close return suggests that the market overreacted overnight with the result that the 
price typically falls during trading hours.  
 
It is important to observe what is happening on the event date. The evening of ED is the last point where the 
S&P 500 has its old composition, and index fund managers have already started rebalancing their portfolios 
(the new composition and divisor adjustment of the S&P 500 index are based on the ED closing prices). The 
close-to-close abnormal return between ED-1 and ED is significantly different from zero when looking at the 
whole  sample  as  well  as  when  looking  at  both  sub-periods.  In  particular,  the  ED-1  close  to  ED  close 
abnormal return is 2.18% for the whole sample (Table 1) and seems to be lower in the more recent period 
(Table 2). However, the ED open-to-close return remains insignificantly different from zero for the recent 
period sub-sample, showing that index fund demand does not appear to drive price patterns. This is not the 
case, though, for the earlier period, where the average stock experiences a significant price increase of 1.49% 
on an open-to-close basis. 
 
The overnight performance between ED close and ED+1 opening is negative, showing that there is no 
further price pressure, and this inference is confirmed from the further negative intraday return (between 
ED+1 open and ED+1 close). Also, comparing the two sub-samples, the overnight ED close to ED+1 open 
performance has not significantly changed through time (t-statistic = 0.96). On ED+1, the change becomes 
effective by the market opening, and the average open-to-close abnormal return for the whole sample is -
0.36%, which is marginally significant.  ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2007-05 
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It is also worth noting that in the more recent sub-period, the AD+1 close-to-close price increase is higher, 
although the ED close-to-close price increase is lower. In other words, the abnormal return premium has 
shifted towards the announcement date. This can be attributed to a potential increase in the number of 
arbitrageurs through time (since the “S&P Game” has become apparent and the number and financial power 
of hedge funds has grown enormously) and to the fact that they may be trying to make a profit by buying the 
stock ahead of index funds. It could be also attributed to an increase of market efficiency (the t-mean for the 
differences in the overnight performance between AD close and AD+1 open of the two sub-samples is highly 
significant and higher for the recent sub-sample), where participants are aware of the positive addition effect 
and thus they drive prices up immediately after the announcement date instead of on the event date. Both of 
the above explanations would ensure that the demand for added stocks on the event date will be satisfied and 
the price pressure will be relatively low, given that the added stocks have gained most of their extra value on 
the first date after announcement. 
 
To conclude, according to all of the above findings, even if the AD+1 close-to-close abnormal return is 
eliminated, there are still some profitable trading opportunities beyond AD+1 until the date of the actual 
event. From Table 1, it can be seen that if the added stock is bought at the close of AD+1 and held until the 
close of ED, a profit of 4.3% can be realized. This level of abnormal return is derived from the cumulative 
performance of the average firm from AD+1 to ED close-to-close. The results thus far are consistent with 
those  of  Beneish  and  Whaley  (1996  and  2002)  and  Cusick  (2002).  More  information  concerning  the 
improvement  of  this  profit  will  be  presented  in  the  following  section,  where  the  tick-by-tick  stock 
performance is examined and stronger inferences can be made about the optimal times to buy and sell the 
added stock. 
 
ii. The Overnight Effect: NASDAQ listed versus NYSE listed stocks  
The NYSE and NASDAQ exchanges are very different in the way they operate and these differences could 
become crucial under certain circumstances. The former is a specialist market, where all trades occur in a 
physical  place,  the  NYSE  trading  floor,  whereas  the  latter  is  a  dealer  market  that  is  based  on  a 
telecommunication network. On the NYSE exchange, individuals are buying and selling from one another and 
the highest bidding price matches the lowest offering (asking) price in a form of a continuous auction. In the 
case of the NASDAQ exchange, the dealers are not on the floor and there is direct trading between investors 
and  their  market  makers  (dealers),  who  are  buyers  or  sellers.  Both  the  specialists  and  the  dealers  are 
responsible for controlling market orders and the flow of trading. The specialists try to ensure ongoing trading 
and facilitate trades between individuals, whereas the dealers create markets for each security. Christie and 
Schultz (1994), Huang and Stoll (1996) and Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) have examined the differences ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2007-05 
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between  dealer  and  auction  markets,  and  have  shed  light  on  the  debate  concerning  the  efficiency  of  a 
fragmented (centralized) over a decentralized market, showing the prevalence of the NYSE as a more efficient 
and less costly exchange. The exchanges also differ in the types of the securities that are traded. Stocks listed 
on the NYSE exchange are typically “blue chips” - i.e., established companies, whereas stocks listed on the 
NASDAQ are usually considered to be more volatile and to possess significant growth opportunities but with 
higher levels of risk.  
 
An important role of any stock market is its ability to absorb large demand or supply shocks smoothly, 
without significantly affecting security prices. If, for some reason, too many orders arrive only on the buy side 
or only on the sell side, then specialists or dealers have to work together to match as many orders as possible 
and to use their own inventories if necessary. Both exchanges claim that they are better at minimising the price 
impact  of  a large  block  trade.  The  main  advantage  of  the  NYSE  relates  to  the  fact  that  the  market  is 
centralized and the specialist can handle more easily any liquidity problems. In addition, the existence of the 
limit order book can provide better liquidity in the sense that the specialist has to continuously take offsetting 
positions. On the other hand, the NASDAQ exchange is relatively decentralized and has a greater market 
depth, due to the increased competition among dealers and to the capability of direct trading between market 
participants in the event of demand or supply shocks. LaPlante and Muscarella (1997) showed that the NYSE 
exchange provides greater liquidity to the market than the NASDAQ exchange in the case of large block 
trades. The resulting price change difference of the NASDAQ over the NYSE is around 0.14%, revealing the 
extra cost of trading on the former exchange.  
 
Inferences about the differences between the two exchanges can be more accurately made when comparing 
open-to-close data, where actual trading is taking place, rather than the close-to-close data used in previous 
studies. The opening price on the NYSE is determined by the specialist in the form of an auction, based on 
the orders arriving before the opening bell in the morning. If there is an imbalance in the orders, the specialist 
seeks to achieve a matching, even if this means buying or selling against the market from the company’s own 
account. Apart from adjusting the opening price in the case of a large block trade, the specialist can also halt 
trading if this is necessary or can delay the opening later than 09.30 until he finds a fair price. In the case of 
NASDAQ listed stocks, market makers create a market for a particular security and post their two sided 
quotes in the computer system, which ranks the quotes. The best bid and offer will represent the opening 
quote.  
 
Table  3  presents  the  average  daily  performance  of  NASDAQ  and  NYSE  listed  stocks  separately.  The 
exchange effect is of interest at this stage. Even if on a close-to-close basis the exchanges seem to produce 
different average abnormal stock return levels on the first trading day after the announcement, most of the ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2007-05 
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difference  occurs  overnight.  NASDAQ listed  stocks  experience  higher  overnight  abnormal  returns  upon 
announcement of addition to the S&P 500. In particular, the level of overnight abnormal return for the 
NASDAQ sample between AD close and AD+1 open is 6.65% on average, relative to 4.20% for the NYSE 
sample. This difference is significant at the 1% level (t-statistic = 4.63). It would appear that investors perceive 
a NASDAQ stock inclusion to be more positive news than the addition of a NYSE stock. The exchange 
effect is confirmed by the open-to-close data. The overnight reactions were exaggerated and the prices of the 
stocks partially reverse from the opening until the closing of AD+1. The price reversal is more intense and 
significant for NASDAQ stocks (-1.95% with a t-statistic of -5.28), than for the NYSE stocks (-0.34% with a 
t-statistic of -1.7), showing an advantage of the specialist market. This result echoes that of Elliott and Warr 
(2003), who used daily data to investigate differences in the index effect across the two markets.  
 
Comparable differences between the two markets take place between the opening and the closing on ED, 
where NYSE stocks experience a positive open-to-close abnormal return of only 0.48% relative to a figure of 
1.05% for NASDAQ stocks. It might be that index fund rebalancing on the NASDAQ market is more costly 
than on the NYSE market. A difference could arise from differential levels of transaction costs as well as 
differing levels of liquidity of NASDAQ versus NYSE added stocks. The overnight abnormal return between 
ED close and ED+1 open is significantly negative on both NASDAQ and NYSE stocks (-1.15% and -0.4% 
respectively) and statistically different for the two samples (t-statistic = 2.69, with the NASDAQ sub-sample 
realising a higher price reversal). However, on an open-to-close basis, only the NYSE abnormal returns are 
significant during ED+1. Even when looking at the two exchanges separately, the actual trading opportunities 
are limited to the days from AD+1 close until ED close, with the NASDAQ sample experiencing higher 
overall cumulative profits. 
 
V. Tick-by-Tick Performance of the Stocks that are Added to the S&P 500 Index 
a) Data and Methodology - The Trade and Quote Database (TAQ) 
The  TAQ  Database  contains  intraday  transactions  data  for  all  securities  listed  on  the  New  York  Stock 
Exchange  (NYSE),  the  NASDAQ  National  Market  System  (NMS)  and  SmallCap  issues  as  well  as  the 
American Stock Exchange (AMEX). This analysis uses the reported trades on each day of the event window 
for the S&P 500 added firms, but tick-by-tick data is only employed for the years 1999 and 2000. The final 
sample consists of 91 firms. In order to be able to connect the previous findings for close-to-close and open-
to-close returns, that analysis is repeated for this sample separately. By doing that, continuous price behavior 
of the average added firm can be traced over the event window and the optimal times to trade the stock can 
be identified.  
 ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2007-05 
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In estimating tick-by-tick abnormal returns, the S&P 500 index cannot be used directly as a benchmark, 
because the intraday changes of the index are significantly less frequent than the intraday changes for the 
added stocks. The closest substitute for the S&P 500 index that is traded as a stock and is also very liquid is 
the SPIDER (SPY) fund3. All the trades recorded on each day are collected from the TAQ Database for the 
sample of firms and for the SPY. A typical entry records the time of the trade, the number of shares traded, 
and the price at which these shares were traded. The official US starting time is 09.30 and the official ending 
time is 16.00. There are also Pre- and Post-Market Close Trades reported before and after this interval. These 
trades occurred between 08.00 and 09.30 or between 16.00 and 17.16. Since they are executed outside the 
current market hours (but within the market reporting hours), they are not included in the analysis. Extensive 
information concerning the systems and trading procedures of the New York Stock Exchange can be found in 
the study of Hasbrouck, Sofianos and Sosebee (1993). 
 
The firms that were added to the index over the years 1999-2000 differ in terms of liquidity and the number 
of trades recorded. Therefore, for a particular interval, e.g. two minutes, one firm’s stock may have traded 100 
times and another only 10 times. To confront this problem, the following steps are performed. First, a reference 
time in seconds from 09.30 to 16.00 is created, since all the trades are downloaded from the database in 
seconds. Second, the recorded trades (one series for the prices and one series for the number of shares) for 
each firm are allocated according to their reported times. The more liquid firms cover all the seconds of the 
reference time and in some cases, there is more than one trade per second which occurred at the same price. To 
overcome this, for those particular seconds, the total number of shares traded at the same price is reported as 
one trade. On the other hand, the less liquid firms have failed to report a trade for some seconds of the day 
and there are gaps in the reference time. However, this is not a problem, since the final chosen time interval is 
longer than a single second and consequently, all firms report at least one trade per time interval.  
 
The final interval selected is five minutes and therefore, the intraday price and volume performance between 
09.30 and 16.00 for each stock has 78 observations per day. In order to compress the reference time in seconds 
into five-minute intervals, in the case of firms with more than one reported trade per five minutes, the sum of 
the reported quantities of shares over that interval is used as the number of shares traded, and the last 
reported price is used as the price over that interval. This is done because the best information concerning the 
fair price of the stock is given from the last reported price of each interval and not from the average price of 
the interval. In the same way, stock markets record the last price4 as the closing price of the day and not the 
weighted average price of the trades throughout the whole day. In the case where the firm has not reported 
any trades over a five-minute interval, the sum of the number of shares traded in that interval is zero and the 
                                                       
3 The SPDR (SPY) fund is an ETF (Exchange Traded Fund) that holds all the components of the S&P 500 index. 
4 In reality, an auction occurs over the last few minutes of the trading day to estimate the final closing price. ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2007-05 
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price for that interval is the same as that of the previous one. Again, this procedure is followed because the 
previous interval price is the latest available information in the market concerning the stock. 
 
The same approach is employed to obtain tick-by-tick prices of the SPIDER (SPY) index fund, which also 
comprises 78 observations per day. Logarithmic returns are then obtained for each stock and for the SPY by 
taking  the  log  of  the  difference  among  the  five-minute  intervals,  consistent  with  the  method  of  Wood, 
McInish and Ord (1985). Abnormal returns are also derived by taking the difference between the stock return 
and the benchmark return for all 78 observations each day: 
i, j i, j SPY, j AR  = R  - R         (4) 
where, Ri    and  RSPY  are the  interval  returns during the  trading  hours  for  each  stock i  and for the  SPY 
respectively and ARi,j is the abnormal stock return for each interval j. 
 
Concerning the intraday trading volume during each day of the event window, the number of shares traded 
per five-minute interval is expressed as a percentage of the total daily traded shares of each firm in order to 
allow comparison among firms of different liquidities. These percentages are then averaged across firms for 
each five-minute interval and are free of any bias that might have occurred due to the differences in the total 
absolute trading volumes of the stocks. This approach can show which part of the total daily trading volume is 
happening over each interval and may reveal the timing of index fund rebalancing. The results presented 
below concern the most important dates of the event window, starting from the morning of announcement 
date (AD), where the market is not yet aware of the future S&P 500 index re-composition.  
 
b) Results 
i. Intraday Firm Performance on the Announcement Date (AD) 
Figure 1 presents the cumulative abnormal tick-by-tick performance of the average added stock on the date of 
announcement (AD). It can be seen that the overall open-to-close return for the sample of 91 firms is not 
more that 0.2%. On the morning of announcement date, there is no information revealed to the market about 
the forthcoming S&P 500 index change, and thus price and volume behavior should be not driven by this 
event. Indeed, there is no particular trend in the average tick-by-tick price performance of the 91 stocks 
(Figure  1),  and  prices  may  be  driven  only  by  the  corresponding  market  tick-by-tick  trend.  The  average 
cumulative abnormal return is generated around a positive mean. Although this analysis involves only 91 
firms, we would argue that the results are representative of the larger sample used earlier since the average 
performance of these stocks is very similar to the open-to-close results reported in the previous section for 
the added firms over the longer sample period. The open-to-close abnormal return reported in Section IV is 
marginally positive (0.12%) though insignificant.  
 ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2007-05 
Copyright 2007 Kappou, Brooks and Ward. All Rights Reserved.  12 
The volatility of the above average performance is due to the fact that there is no information released to the 
market, and in each five-minute interval, the stock behavior is interpreted as being highly dependent on the 
S&P 500 tick-by-tick trend reflected in the SPY. In addition, this volatility may be attributed to the bid-ask 
bounce;  i.e.  the  trades  are  filled  either  on  the  bid  or  on  the  ask  side  and  therefore,  the  average  firm 
performance is affected by the continuous up-down price movement, due to the bid-ask spread. Given that 
the  pattern  is  traced  every  five  minutes,  these  fluctuations  should  be  expected.  Since  additions  are  not 
happening at a single point in time but throughout the whole 1999-2000 period, where the S&P could be 
bullish or bearish, there is no trend in the pattern of intraday AD performance. 
 
To check whether there is any anticipation of the S&P press release (that will be posted after the close of 
trading), we show the volume figures over the last minutes of that trading day. Figure 2 presents the total 
number of shares traded per five minutes for the average firm. The total number of shares for each interval is 
expressed as a percentage of the total daily volume. These percentages are then averaged for each interval 
against the number of firms. For a typical trading day, a higher volume is expected over the first few minutes 
after the market opening as well as over the last few minutes before the market close and usually, intraday 
volumes trace out a “smile pattern” (Wood, McInish and Ord, 1985). However, the average volume observed 
over the last five minutes of AD, expressed as a percentage of the total volume occurred during the day, is 
surprisingly high. This may indicate leakage of information that will be officially released soon after the close 
of trading. Investors who were actually capable of buying the added stock before the AD close, due to 
potential leakage of information, could enjoy a highly significant abnormal return until the next day’s closing. 
Those who did not buy the stock on AD close will have to suffer the huge overnight price increase and buy 
the next day (AD+1) at a higher price. The tick-by-tick performance of the first day after announcement is 
described in the following section. 
 
ii. Intraday Firm Performance on the First Day After Announcement (AD+1) 
After the close of AD, S&P releases information about the future change in the index composition and the 
market is now aware of the names of the stocks involved and of the future event date. There is a significant 
price increase overnight, and the next morning the stock opens at a higher price (4.89%, reported in Table 1 
for the firms added over the longer sample period). According to the close-to-close analysis, the stock price 
change is expected to reverse during the day, because the close-to-close abnormal return is roughly 4%. The 
open-to-close performance is significantly negative and investors or arbitrageurs who want to be involved in 
any arbitrage opportunities must buy the stock on that date. Since the average stock price reverses during the 
day, it is worth checking whether there is an optimal time to buy the stock, i.e. when the lowest price level 
occurs on average.  
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Figure 3 presents the tick-by-tick cumulative performance of the average added stock on the first date after 
announcement. It can be seen that the price experiences a continuous negative trend, losing part of the 
overnight price increase. The price correction of AD+1 shows that investors have realized the positive effect 
of addition, but the reflection of this future event on the stock price was overshot overnight. Under the 
assumption that arbitrageurs and other market participants have realized that during AD+1, trading the price 
drops monotonically, they should wait and buy the stock at the market close. However, according to the 
volume levels presented in Figure 4, it is evident that high trading activity occurs at the opening price. This is 
reasonable  given  the  overnight  change  of  almost  5%  (reported  in  Section  IV),  an  increase  which  is 
significantly high and therefore, market participants may assume a reversal within the day and start selling the 
stock short at the opening.  
 
Figure 4 shows how the total daily volume is allocated to the five-minute intervals between 09.30 and 16.00. 
Indeed, there is selling pressure at the market opening and during the first half hour, because volume figures 
are at their highest levels relative to total daily trading, and the price decreases. The price of the firm that will 
soon be added to the index seems to partially lose its significant overnight increase during the first day after 
the revision announcement. In Section IV, it was shown that the overall open-to-close return for that day is 
significant. 
 
The buy side of these trades may be provided by participants who aim to hold the added stock in the long run. 
The best time to buy the stock is a few minutes before the close, when the price is at its lowest level. 
However, since the stock opens at a considerably higher level than that of the previous close, one could 
enhance the tradable return by starting to sell short the stock at the opening of AD+1 and then buying it back 
again at the close of trading when it hits its lowest level, and then taking a long position in the stock until the 
event date (ED).   
 
The firm’s intraday performance may be affected by the market’s overall trend during that period. In an 
attempt to check whether there is a difference in the tick-by-tick performance between the firms affected by 
the trading environment, two sub-samples for an S&P 500 “bullish day” and an S&P 500 “bearish day” are 
examined separately. The sample of firms at the AD+1 date for which the S&P 500 has a negative open-to-
close performance is larger. In the case of these two sub-samples, the intraday returns are not adjusted against 
the SPY since the market effect is taken into account in a different way.  
 
Figure 5 reports the intraday performance of the first day after announcement for the stocks with a positive 
S&P 500 open-to-close return and for the stocks with a negative S&P 500 open-to-close return. It is apparent 
that although the average cumulative returns of the two sub-samples move in tandem until 12.30, beyond this ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2007-05 
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point, the prices of the stocks with a bullish S&P 500 day reverse partly until the close. However, in both 
cases the open-to-close return is negative and there is an opportunity to buy the stock at a relatively low price 
and to unwind this position on the event date. Again, a short position at the open with a reverse long position 
at the close will enhance total trading profits, especially in the cases where the S&P 500 index experiences a 
price fall on that day. 
 
To complete the AD+1 intraday analysis, it is also worth examining firms listed on the NASDAQ and NYSE 
exchanges separately. On the first day after announcement, the cumulative abnormal intraday performance of 
NASDAQ  listed  stocks  is  slightly  worse  than  that  of  the  NYSE  listed  stocks.  The  pattern  observed  is, 
however, the same (Figure 6), and there is no obvious exchange effect. This difference, especially towards the 
close of the trading day, may be attributed to the fact that NASDAQ listed stocks had stronger overnight 
performances than stocks listed on the NYSE (as reported in Section IV), and therefore the AD+1 price 
reversal is more for the former than the latter. 
 
iii. Intraday Firm Performance on the Event Date (ED) 
The date where the change in the S&P 500 re-composition becomes effective is the most important date in 
terms of index fund rebalancing. The change takes place after the close of trading on ED and Standard and 
Poor’s makes the index divisor adjustment by using ED closing prices. Therefore, index fund managers have 
to complete their purchases as close to the stock’s closing price as possible if they wish to minimize their 
tracking errors. If they postpone part of their investment in the added stock until next day’s morning, then 
they  bear  the  risk  of  realizing  a  substantial  tracking  error,  since  the  overnight  price  change  may  be 
considerable.  
 
Figure 7 presents the tick-by-tick performance of the average added stock on the event date (ED). The graph 
shows that the stock price falls during the day until around lunchtime, but closes at a positive level, probably 
caused by index fund demand. There is no apparent buying pressure until 12.00, but after that time, the price 
has a positive trend until the close, and becomes volatile over the last hour. The stock price reaches its highest 
level (which is marginally positive) at the market close. There are two possible explanations for this result. The 
first is that index funds might have started their purchases earlier, by choosing to potentially enhance their 
portfolio returns at the possible expense of tracking error. The second explanation may be attributed to the 
fact that market is no longer adding value to the stock, since it rallied from the date of announcement until the 
event and therefore, the open-to-close return of ED is close to zero. Arbitrageurs can now unwind their 
positions by selling to index fund participants without upwardly affecting the price. 
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The trading volume on that date is also of great interest. Figure 8 confirms that index funds are completing 
their purchases a few minutes before the close. The volume reported over the last five minutes, expressed as a 
percentage of the total volume for that day, is more than 10%. It is worth noting that the volume figures are 
very smooth throughout the day and there is no increased trading at the market opening. Moreover, there is 
no increased volume even after 12.00 when the stock price begins a positive trend as shown in Figure 7. 
Volume figures become significantly high only for the last two intervals with levels of 6.4% and 10.2% 
respectively. If it is taken into account that the overall trading volume is 16 times higher than that of a typical 
day, then the numbers become even more extreme. There is strong evidence that most index funds are waiting 
to buy the added stock as close to 16.00 as possible, and hence that they are concerned with tracking error. 
 
To complete the analysis for the event day, the sample is divided into firms that are added on a “bullish S&P 
500 day” and firms that are added on a “bearish S&P 500 day”. Figure 9 confirms that even in the case where 
there  is  a  positive  daily  market  trend,  the  stock  does  not  have  a  good  performance  on  the Event  day. 
Although the bullish sub-sample consistently out-performs the bearish sub-sample, particularly over the last 
half hour, it does not result in a significantly positive abnormal return. However, when the exchange effect is 
taken into account, the NYSE and NASDAQ sub-samples behave differently. As expected, the NASDAQ 
stocks’ prices are driven up by more than 1.5% on an open-to-close basis, while NYSE firms close down 1%. 
The performance of the NYSE firms is not even affected by the increased volume during the last ten minutes 
and the average return remains at negative levels (relative to the market opening) throughout the whole event 
day (Figure 10). The tick-by-tick analysis therefore confirms that from an arbitrageur’s perspective, NASDAQ 
stocks might be more profitable. However, it is surprising that NYSE listed stocks achieve only negative 
returns on that day, given the increased demand caused by index funds. 
 
The event date is the last profitable day for non-index trackers who are trading the added stocks, since the 
close-to-close  returns  reported  after  that  day  are  significantly  negative.  Not  only  is  the  price  pressure 
exhausted by the event date, but there are three consecutive and significant close-to-close price reversals for 
ED+1, ED+2 and ED+3. These reversals can be exploited by selling the stock short, a strategy that will be 
explained in detail in a later section. The following sub-section concentrates on the intraday price behavior 
when the stock is actually a member of the S&P 500 index. 
 
v. Intraday Firm Performance on the First Day after the Event (ED+1) 
On the first day after the event, the average added firm experiences a continuous price drop. The volumes at 
the beginning of the day are high, perhaps indicating that index fund rebalancing may still be happening or 
that arbitrageurs are still unwinding their positions. However, the price does not seem to be positively affected 
by index fund demand. Figure 11 presents the cumulative intraday firm performance on the first day after the ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2007-05 
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event, in conjunction with the volumes that occurred at each interval. Over the first ten minutes of the trading 
day, almost 9% of the total trading occurs. The price pattern, though, is not consistent when the sub-samples 
of firms added on a bullish ED+1 day and of firms added on a bearish ED+1 day are examined separately. 
Figure 12 shows that the overall open-to-close market trend matters and firms added on a bullish S&P 500 
day experience positive tick-by-tick returns of 0.7% and firms added on a bearish S&P 500 day lose -1.4% on 
an open-to-close basis. The exchange effect, on the other hand, appears irrelevant on that date and hence the 
analysis is not presented here. 
 
vi. Intraday Firm Performance on the Second and Third Days after the Event 
According  to  our  previous  study,  the  close-to-close  abnormal  return  remains  significant  and  marginally 
negative on ED+2 and ED+3, which can also be seen from Table 1. The added stocks appear to have a 
notable trend over those two days and are different between bullish and bearish days as well when NYSE and 
NASDAQ samples are examined separately. However, they do not allow us to infer firm conclusions about 
further index fund trading behavior and hence are not reported.5 In addition, beyond ED+3, the performance 
of the stocks starts to depend mostly on the corresponding overall market trend and the price patterns start to 
look similar to those reported in Figure 1 where AD is examined.  
 
VI. An Analysis of the Index Effect in Continuous Time 
The above intraday analysis has captured the stock pattern from the market open until the close on the 
important key dates of the event window. The figures of the tick-by-tick cumulative abnormal return of the 
average stock were plotted under the assumption of an opening return of 0% relative to the previous close i.e. 
the open-to-close return on a particular day was isolated. The results of the previous section, where open-to-
close returns are adjusted using the SPIDER index fund, do not contradict those obtained in Section IV that 
refer to the longer sample period. This section will describe a continuous price pattern taking into account 
close-to-close, open-to-close, and overnight abnormal returns and will determine the total actual profits from 
trading the added stocks, using the 266 firms added to the S&P 500 index over the years 1993-2002.  
 
Table 4 presents a summary of the actual profits that can be made during S&P 500 index addition events 
based on the abnormal return levels that were found in Section IV. The timing of buying and selling the 
stocks will be based on the tick-by-tick analysis presented in Section V. The strategy involves three basic steps: 
First, being short the added stock from the opening of the first day after the announcement until the close, 
since the tick by tick results showed that the lowest price level was at the market close. Second, the reversal of 
the position until the close of the event date and third, being short the stock again from the close of the event 
                                                       
5 Results for the tick-by-tick stock price and volume performance for the second and third day after the event, as well as other analysis 
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date until the close of the third day after the event. From Table 4 it can be seen that the first part of the 
tradable abnormal return is -0.83%.  
 
At this point, it is important to mention the way that the cumulative abnormal return between AD+1 and ED 
is calculated. The number of days between announcement and event varies among the added firms and the 
average period is 5.06 days. As shown in Figure 13, most intervals are around four and five days and it would 
be difficult to derive strong conclusions about the price performance after AD+7, since the number of 
observations becomes very small.  
 
There are two possible ways of calculating the cumulative abnormal performance until the close of the event 
date. The first method is to calculate the cumulative return from AD+1 close to ED close and divide it by the 
number of days in the interval from AD+1 to ED, to obtain the average rest-of-the-window daily abnormal 
return for each stock. Then this average daily abnormal return should be multiplied by the average interval 
length which is 4.06 days (because AD+1 is not included). The sum of all these returns divided by the number 
of additions will give the final estimate of the average cumulative abnormal return from AD+1 close until ED 
close.  By  that  way,  the  estimated  returns  are  adjusted  for  the  different  intervals,  i.e.  a  10%  cumulative 
abnormal return of an added stock realised over a 2-day window between AD+1 close and ED close has a 
different magnitude than a 10% return of another added stock realised over a longer interval.  
 
The second and simpler way to calculate an average window return from AD+1 close to ED close is to take 
the sum of the cumulative realised returns for each firm from AD+1 close to ED close and divide it by the 
number of firms. This method does not account for the differences in the interval lengths. However, when 
both methods are employed, the results are not significantly different and therefore, only the results from the 
simpler (second) method are reported. 
 
The cumulative abnormal return from AD+1 close to ED close that constitutes the second part of the 
strategy is 3.75% and is highly significant. Finally, a short position at the stock from ED close until ED+3 
close will result in another profit of 2.26%. The total tradable profit is 6.84% on average. The arrows in Figure 
14 show the optimal times to buy and sell the added stock after the announcement of addition. The negative 
intraday AD+1 abnormal return, the positive cumulative AD+1 close to ED close abnormal return as well as 
the negative cumulative ED close to ED+3 close abnormal return are all significant.6 
 
                                                       
6 Transactions costs have not been accounted for in calculating these trading profits. Also, the short selling rule that applies to US 
securities may affect the profitability of the short positions since the “up-tick rule” will prevent speculators from talking enormous 
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Finally, it is worth mentioning that the negative intraday return of AD+1 represents the price correction after 
the large overnight performance from AD close to AD+1 opening. It was also shown that the positive 
overnight return (non-tradable) between AD close and AD+1 opening tended to increase through time, as did 
the price reversal on the next day (AD+1 open-to-close). Therefore, the profits captured from selling the 
stock at the AD+1 opening and buying it back at the AD+1 close would also have increased through time. 
 
VII. Conclusions 
The first part of this study disaggregated the close-to-close abnormal returns into overnight and open-to-close 
abnormal returns, showing that the close-to-close positive effect observed one day after the announcement of 
addition cannot be traded. Upon announcement, there is an overnight overreaction of 4.89% for the average 
firm with the price reversing significantly (-0.83%) from the opening until the closing of the next day (AD+1). 
Therefore, the first day price increase cannot be traded, since the stock cannot be bought in the evening of 
AD. However, profitable trading opportunities occur between the first day after announcement and the date 
of the actual event. The overnight price change seems to have increased over time, indicating an improvement 
in the level of market efficiency and a decrease in the profits available to arbitrageurs. In addition, the event 
date abnormal return caused mainly by index fund rebalancing has diminished over time, because most of the 
positive effect of being added to the S&P 500 index is reflected in the stock price in advance of the actual 
event. 
 
When looking at the overnight performance of NASDAQ and NYSE listed stocks separately, the NASDAQ 
sample experiences higher overnight abnormal returns between AD close and AD+1 opening. Only the 
AD+1 open-to-close abnormal returns can provide evidence of potential exchange effects and NASDAQ 
stocks  have  a  highly  significant  price  reversal  on  that  date,  while  the  price  reversal  of  NYSE  stocks  is 
insignificant, showing that the specialist market may be able to better absorb large demand shocks. 
 
The second part of this study analysed the tick-by-tick performance of the firms that were added to the S&P 
500  index  over  the  years  1999-2000.  The  benchmark  for  estimating  abnormal  returns  was  the  SPIDER 
exchange traded fund that has a similar liquidity to the average S&P 500 stock and behaves like a stock which 
tracks the S&P 500 index. To summarize the main findings of the tick-by-tick analysis, the intraday stock price 
pattern of AD appears to be random, because information about the future index change has not been 
released to the market at that time. However, a relatively high volume is observed over the last five minutes of 
this trading day, indicating a potential leakage of information before the S&P press release. During the trading 
hours of the first day after announcement (AD+1), the stock experiences a price drop without reversing at all, 
a behavior explained mostly by an overshoot in the overnight price increase that occurred between AD close 
and AD+1 open.  ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2007-05 
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It is also worth noting the huge trading volume occurring over the last ten minutes of the event date, which 
constitutes the last possible opportunity for index fund managers to rebalance their portfolios before the 
change becomes effective. This abnormal volume level provides evidence that most index funds seek to 
rebalance their portfolios as close to 16.00 as possible, and that they are concerned with tracking error. 
However, this increase in volume is not accompanied by a price increase, perhaps showing that other market 
participants, especially arbitrageurs, are unwinding their long positions in the added stock. Therefore, there is 
enough supply to satisfy index fund demand. After the event date, there is no further price pressure and the 
stock price drops significantly both on an open-to-close and overnight basis. The overall reported profit from 
AD close until ED close cannot be all tradable. The first opportunity to trade the stock is during the trading 
hours of AD+1. 
 
From the tick-by-tick analysis, it was shown that the optimal strategy for trading the stock is to sell it short on 
AD+1 at the market opening and to buy it back at the market close. At the same time, a further long position 
on the stock should be taken at AD+1 close until the close of ED. Finally, a further short position should be 
taken on the stock between ED close and ED+3 close. The profits from these trades are all significant and 
total almost 7%. Therefore, we conclude that the perceived reduction over time in the index effect based on 
daily price series masks the considerable profits that are available to arbitrageurs who are willing to trade on an 
intra-daily basis.  
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Table 1: Close-to-close and open-to-close average daily firm performance between AD 
and ED+1 
Days  AD  AD+1  AD+2  AD+3  AD+4  AD+5  ED  ED+1  ED+2  ED+3 
Close-to-close 
AR  0.40%  4.06%  0.33%  0.60%  0.60%  0.59%  2.18%  -0.96%  -0.52%  -0.78% 
t-stat  1.67  16.30  1.66  2.48  2.36  1.41  6.57  -4.05  -2.64  -3.62 
                     
Open-to-Close 
AR  0.12%  -0.83%  0.19%  0.20%  0.22%  0.00%  0.64%  -0.36%  -0.32%  -0.62% 
t-stat  0.68  -4.50  1.05  0.92  0.91  0.01  2.39  -1.96  -1.78  -3.22 
                     
Overnight Performance on the Announcement and Event Dates 
AD close to AD+1 open    4.89%***  ED close to ED+1 open   -0.60%*** 
 
Notes: Figures in bold denote statistics that are significant at the 5% level or better. Three asterisks in the case of 
overnight returns denote significance at 1% level. 
 
Table 2: Close-to-close and open-to-close average daily firm performance between AD 
and ED+1 over two different sub-periods 
 
Days  AD  AD+1  AD+2  AD+3  AD+4  AD+5  ED  ED+1 
1993-1997 
Close-to-Close AR  -0.05%  3.91%***   0.41%*    0.03%    0.27%   0.60%  3.10%***  -0.79%*** 
Open-to-Close AR  0.02%     0.02%  0.16%    0.10%    0.11%   0.38%  1.49%***    -0.37%* 
Overnight Performance on the Announcement and Event Dates 
AD close to AD+1 open   3.89%***    ED close to ED+1 open   -0.42%***   
1998-2002 
Close-to-Close AR    0.62%*    4.13%***  0.28%   0.89%**   0.84%**  0.59%  1.73%***  -1.04%*** 
Open-to-Close AR   0.17%    -1.25%***  0.20%     0.25%     0.31%   -0.17%   0.23%    -0.36% 
Overnight Performance on the Announcement and Event Dates 
AD close to AD+1 open    5.38%***    ED close to ED+1 open   -0.68%***   
t-Statistic for the Overnight Differences Between the Two Sub-Periods 
AD to AD+1 overnight  2.85***    ED to ED+1 overnight      0.96 
 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2007-05 
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Table 3: Close-to-close and open-to-close average daily firm performance between AD 
and ED+1 for NASDAQ and NYSE listed stocks 
Days  AD  AD+1  AD+2  AD+3  AD+4  AD+5  ED  ED+1 
NASDAQ listed stocks 
Close to Close AR  0.00%  4.70%***  0.13%  1.17%*  1.94%***  1.24%  3.53%***  -1.48%** 
Open-to-close AR  -0.28%  -1.95%***  0.17%  -0.09%  1.34%**  -0.10%  1.05%  -0.33% 
Overnight Performance on the Announcement and Event Dates 
AD close to AD+1 open    6.65%***    ED close to ED+1 open    -1.15%***     
NYSE listed stocks 
Close to Close AR  0.55%**  3.86%***  0.42%*  0.37%  0.09%  0.22%  1.65%***  -0.77%*** 
Open-to-close AR  0.27%   -0.34%    0.20%     0.26%  -0.21%  -0.04%   0.48%*  -0.37%** 
Overnight Performance on the Announcement and Event Dates 
AD close to AD+1 open    4.20%***    ED close to ED+1 open    -0.40%***     
t-Statistic for the Overnight Differences Between the Two Sub-Samples 
AD close  to AD+1 open  4.63***    ED close to ED+1 open  2.69***   
 




Table 4: Actual Profits from trading Index inclusions over the years 1993-2002 
 
  AD  AD+1 
Interval Return 
AD+1close to ED 
close 
ED+1  ED+2  ED+3 
Close to close    3.75%**  -0.96%***  -0.52%***  -0.78%*** 
Open to close  -0.83%***         
Cumulative  Actual  Trading 
Profits 
  0.83%  4.58%      6.84% 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
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 Figure 1: Tick-by-tick cumulative abnormal performance of the average added stock on 
















































Figure 2: Number of shares traded over each five-minute interval expressed as a 
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Figure 3: Tick-by-tick cumulative abnormal performance of the average added stock on 





Figure 4: Number of shares traded over each five-minute interval expressed as a 
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Figure 5: Tick-by-tick cumulative abnormal performance of the average added stock of 




Figure 6: Tick-by-tick cumulative abnormal performance of the average NASDAQ vs. 












09:30 10:30 11:30 12:30 13:30 14:30 15:30




































09:30 10:30 11:30 12:30 13:30 14:30 15:30



























NASDAQ NYSEICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2007-05 
  26 
 
Figure 7: Tick-by-tick cumulative abnormal performance of the average added stock on 




Figure 8: Number of shares traded over each five-minute interval expressed as a 
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Figure 9: Tick-by-tick cumulative abnormal performance of the average added stock of 





Figure 10: Tick-by-tick cumulative abnormal performance of the average NASDAQ vs. 
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Figure 11: Tick-by-tick average cumulative firm abnormal performance and number of 
shares traded over each five-minute interval expressed as a percentage of the total daily 




Figure 12: Tick-by-tick cumulative abnormal performance of the average added stock of 
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